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Business under Adverse Home Country Institutions: 




We expand the institutional perspective of international business by exploring the 
range of institutions outside the host country that influence international business. We 
use a critical case, Myanmar, to explore the dynamics of institutional constraints and 
the reaction of business to such constraints. Our in-depth case analysis focuses on four 
industries for the period 1996 to 2011. On this basis, we develop the concept of ‘low 
profile strategy’ and propose a conceptual framework of home country pressures 
influencing multinational enterprises’ international operation, and the variation of 
their impact across industries and firms. This framework provides a foundation for 
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As multinational enterprises (MNEs) operate in multiple countries they are exposed to 
multiple sets of institutions (Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008; Peng, Wang & Jiang, 
2008). International business scholars have investigated how institutions in host 
economies affect MNEs entering emerging economies, notably their entry strategies 
(Brouthers, 1995, 2002; Meyer et al., 2009), marketing strategies (Dawar & 
Chattopadhay, 2002) and human resource management practices (Ferner et al., 2001; 
Gooderham et al., 1999). In contrast, the role of institutions in the home country 
received little attention. 
Home country institutions play a critical supporting role in economies at early 
stages of their outward foreign direct investment (FDI), as has been shown for Japan 
in the 1970s (Ozawa, 1979) and more recently China (Yang, et al.,  2007; Luo, et al., 
2010; Morck, et al. 2008; Wang, et al., 2012) and Vietnam (Nguyen et al., 2013). In 
particular, home country institutions shape firms’ ability to access resources in their 
home environment and to obtain necessary regulative approvals. However, they can 
also create pressures on the strategies and practices in foreign countries, for example 
with respect to ethical business practices or standards of labor (Hartman, Shaw and 
Stevenson, 2003; Spar & Yoffee, 1999). Home country institutions may even go as far 
as delegitimizing business in certain foreign contexts at all. Such extra-territorial 
effects of home institutions, however, have rarely been analysed such that we only 
have limited understanding how they influence international business operations.  
Home country institutions influencing firms outside the country’s boundaries 
are an increasingly important phenomenon. These pressures take all of the three forms 
identified by Scott (2002): regulative, normative and cognitive. Regulative pressures 
arise, among other sources, from legislation affecting for example exports and 
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imports, tax laws, and foreign corrupt practices. Normative pressures arise from 
norms advocated by actors such as governmental and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and they may be enforced through actions of stakeholders of the firm such as 
customers, employees, or shareholders (Christmann, 2004; Doh & Guay, 2006; 
Teegen, Doh & Vachani, 2004). Cognitive institutions arise from shared beliefs and 
assumption that organizations abide to without conscious analysis or thought (Zucker, 
1983). They too are influenced by the media (Spar, 1998) and NGOs via public 
debates that shape awareness of, for example, conditions in a foreign country.  
The pressure of home country institutions is particularly pertinent with respect 
to host countries that pursue policies that violate widely shared ethical norms. In some 
politically sensitive cases, international sanctions have been imposed, notably on 
South Africa during the apartheid regime (Kumar, Lamb & Wokutch, 2002; van Wyk, 
et al., 2004), Iran during over dispute of nuclear weapons development (Carswell, 
1981; Torbat, 2005), and on Myanmar during the military regime (Holliday, 2005; 
Martin 1012; Silverstein, 2001). In these cases, a mix of institutional pressures aimed 
to dissuade MNEs from engaging in the country, though there was no 
comprehensively enforced legal ban. Scholars of politics, law and economics have 
analysed the effectiveness of such sanctions in achieving their political aims (Pape, 
1997; Torbat, 2005). However, to date no studies explored the reactions of firms on a 
more micro-level using the theoretical perspectives of international business research.  
We initiate this research agenda by investigating firms in a ‘critical case’ 
(Flvybjerg, 2006), where the aforementioned range of institutions is likely to be in 
strong evidence: Myanmar (Thein and Pick, 2009). As emphasized by Eisenhardt 
(1989), a case study approach allows us to explore and understand the ‘dynamics’ of 
the phenomenon, in our study MNE operations under extreme adverse pressures. 
5 
 
Specifically, it allows us first to test whether such pressures can be effective in 
inhibiting business at all, and second to explore how firms act under such institutional 
pressures where they are not overshadowed by other institutions, such as those of the 
host economy. Our qualitative investigation thus explores two research questions: (1) 
which home institutions affect doing business in or with Myanmar? (2) how do MNEs 
adopt their strategies to these home institutions? We are primarily interested in the 
second question, but the discussion above suggests that we need a solid understanding 
of the first question to meaningfully address the second one.  
Within the case of Myanmar, we use purposeful sampling on the basis of 
initial research of the relevant context (Poulis, Poulis & Plakoyannaki, 2013) to 
identify four sectors of industry using a 2x2 matrix structure to capture critical 
variations across industries in which despite international sanctions, at least some 
MNEs have continued or even extended their operations between 1996 and 2011. We 
thus distinguish market versus resource seeking and labor versus capital intensive 
operations. Comparisons across the four sectors provide rich foundations to explore 
variations in the impact of institutional pressures.  
We contribute to the literature in multiple ways. First, we offer an integrative 
framework to analyze home country institutional pressures on businesses in a 
particular host country. Second, we offer a rich qualitative analysis of business in 
Myanmar, a context that to date received limited consideration in the international 
business literature. Third, we derive propositions regarding the determinants of exit 
and low profile strategies to guide future research. Fourth, we open research on 
locally relevant research questions in South East Asia that received little attention in 
international business research to date (Meyer, 2006; Nguyen, et al., 2013; Pananond, 
2007; Tipton, 2009).  
6 
 
2. Institutional perspective of international business 
International business scholars have identified institutions as a key set of variables 
influencing the activities of MNEs (Peng, 2003; Peng et al., 2008). Institutions have 
been defined as the rules of the game and their enforcement mechanism (North, 
1990). They have primarily been analysed for host economies, especially emerging 
ones, that constrain the operations of foreign entrants through institutional voids 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1999), high transaction costs (Meyer et al. 2009), weak 
intellectual property rights protection (Khoury & Peng, 2011) or high uncertainty 
(Delios & Henisz, 2003; Brouthers et al. 2002). Businesses respond to adverse 
institutions either by staying out of the pertinent market, by adapting their 
organizational forms, or by building competences to deal with these particular 
institutional constraints (Khanna, Palepu & Bullock, 2010). Relatedly, businesses 
experience differences (or ‘distance’) in the sets of institutions in home and host 
countries as a barrier that increases costs of doing business, while also creating some 
opportunities for institutional arbitrage (Estrin, Baghdasaryan & Meyer, 2009; 
Kostova et al., 2008).  
 This international business literature, as well as economics literature in the 
tradition of North, often treats institutions as exogenous. This may be a reasonable 
approximation if and when analyzing small firms and short time horizons. However, 
institutions are at least in the long run influenced by both businesses and other 
institutional actors such as political parties and NGOs. For example, MNEs with 
substantial bargaining power vis-à-vis local stakeholders may also engage with host 
country governments to influence the regulative pressures pertaining to them (Hillman 
& Wan, 2005; Kobrin, 1987; Kwok & Tadasse, 2006; Nebus & Ruffin, 2010). 
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Therefore, in contrast to mainstream economic literature, the organizations literature 
therefore generally treats institutions as endogenous (Hoffman, 1999; Kostova, 1999).  
As our study analyses a long time period and some of the businesses 
concerned are fairly big, we cannot maintain the assumption of exogenous 
institutions, and we need to incorporate the evolution of the institutions themselves in 
the analysis. Moreover, many of the normative and cognitive institutions pertaining to 
MNEs are not directly observable, but can only be identified indirectly by observing 
the statements of observers or institutional actors, as well as the reactions of 
businesses to such statements. This suggests that we need to scan broadly to identify 
such institutions.  
Another limitation of prior research is the insufficient attention to institutions 
outside the country of operations. Some studies considered bilateral or supra-national 
institutions and agreements (Ramamurti, 2001) or the bargaining between home and 
host governments, and with MNEs, about the rules that apply to international business 
operations (Grosse, 2003; Stopford & Strange, 1991). However, few if any studies 
explore a wide range of home country institutions on international business activities. 
This leads us to consider how home country institutions may affect outward 
international business. Many countries have created institutions that support 
international business activities of firms from their country, especially exports or 
export-enhancing FDI (Ozawa, 1979; Luo et al., 2010; Nguyen et al., 2013). 
However, in some cases, institutions in home countries aim to constrain outward FDI, 
notably the practices employed by MNEs (Hartman et al., 2003). This may be 
motivated by hypernorms that the home society believes ought to be applied by 
MNEs overseas (Donaldson & Preston, 1995), though such motivations are at times 
indistinguishable from protectionism when outward activities are associated with 
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offshoring of operations and thus trigger political debates concerning possible job 
losses at home (Doh, 2005). Such institutions concern in particular labor, environment 
and corruption related practices and standards, and have led to widespread 
introduction of codes of ethics or standards of practice in MNEs (Christman, 2004; 
Hartman, et al., 2003; Kolk & van Tulder, 2004; Spar & Yoffee, 1999). In other cases, 
institutions delegitimize entirely doing business with certain partners or in certain 
territories. Such institutions are typically politically motivated and aim to penalize a 
country for posing a military threat or for violating basic human rights (Carswell, 
1981; van Wyk et al. 2004; Holliday, 2005). In this paper, we are concerned with this 
latter type of institutions. 
Home country institutions differ from host country institutions in that firms 
are ‘born’ into the organizational field of the home country, and hence normally do 
not have the option to ‘opt out’ of these institutions.1 In contrast, an MNE that does 
not want to be exposed to the institutions of a host country could withdraw or not 
enter (or use the threat of exit to exert pressure on local governments to change a 
particular regulation).  
Institutions take regulative, normative and cognitive forms (Hoffman, 1999, 
Kostova, 1999, Scott, 2001), all of which can also influence business outside their 
country of origin. Regulative institutions normally apply to the territory of the 
regulating authority, such as a nation state. However, in some cases law makers or 
regulators extend the scope of their laws extraterritorially to regulate activities of their 
citizens or businesses elsewhere, as in the case of anti-corruption legislation in OECD 
countries: companies and individuals can be prosecuted in their home country for 
bribes paid abroad (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). In the special case of US ‘Alien Tort 
                                                        
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. Here, ‘normally’ allows for the rare 
cases of firms moving headquarters to another country and thus escaping home institutions such 
as tax legislation (Meyer and Xia, 2012). 
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Law’, companies may even be sued in the US for violations of the, vaguely defined, 
‘law of nations’, for example if they are deemed to be associated with organizations 
or governments violating human rights (Holzmeyer, 2009; Wernick, 2012). Other 
regulative institutions may impose tariffs, taxes, reporting requirements, or legal 
liabilities that create additional costs for firms operating in a foreign country.  
Normative institutions establish norms on how to conduct business abroad, for 
example in the form of ‘hypernorms’ (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1995) or minimum 
standards that are deemed to apply beyond national borders. This can go as far as 
designating a country as unfit to be a partner for business at all because of its 
intolerably low standards of, for example, human rights. However, norms vary and 
there is little international agreement beyond very abstract concepts as to what 
actually constitutes an internationally applicable hypernorm (Hartman et al., 2003). 
Hence, normative pressures affecting businesses vary dependent on where a firm 
originates from, and where it operates (Kourula, 2011). 
Cognitive institutions guide organizations’ “understanding of the nature of 
reality and the frames through which that meaning is developed” (Hoffman, 1999: 
353). In the context of our study, they refer to cognition of corporate decision makers 
and customers regarding the nature of the foreign business contexts, and their 
perceived (not necessarily objective) linkage between business activities and 
undesirable practices by the host country government. Firms align to normative and 
cognitive pressures by developing new organizational practices or by engaging 
directly with the stakeholders (Frynas 2005; Oetzel & Ketz, 2012; Sharma & 
Henriques, 2005). Normative and cognitive institutions thus have been shown to 
affect corporate performance, at least under some conditions (Davidson, Worrel & El 
Jelly, 1995; Doh, Howton, Howton & Siegel, 2010; King & Soule, 2007). 
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Scott (2002) treats the three forms of institutions as analytically and 
operationally distinct, while Hirsch (1997) argues that the development of one form 
will influence the development of other forms. The nature of this interdependence is 
however disputed. For example, Hoffman (1999: 365) observed a sequence from 
questioning of prior organizational beliefs to regulative change, to normative change, 
and eventually to cognitive change. At the outset of our study we kept an open mind 
for the sequence of changes in institutions. For example, greater awareness of a 
particular human rights issue may change taken-for-granted assumptions and thus 
trigger a discourse that leads to normative pressures and new regulation.  
Moreover, institutional change in a home country evolves under the influence 
of institutional actors, especially governments and NGOs. Formal institutions such as 
sanctions in form of for example a visa ban for key officials or outright prohibition of 
trade or financial transactions with a country are established by governments or 
legislators. In addition, NGOs are acting with the explicit aim to generate institutional 
pressures, including awareness (cognition) of conditions they consider undesirable, 
promotion of norms by which business ought to behave, and lobbying of governments 
to issue legislation that supports their aims (Kourula, 2011; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). 
Normative pressures triggered by NGOs affect a firm’s legitimacy, especially when 
supported by consumer boycotts or shareholder resolutions. Thus, NGO activism 
against firms was found to negatively influence share price performance (Davidson et 
al., 1995; King & Soule, 2007; Kumar et al. 2002; Wernick, 2011), while 
endorsements may have a positive effect (Doh, et al., 2010). 
Putting these theoretical considerations together led us to the left hand side of 
the initial theoretical framework for this study. In developing their strategies abroad, 
firms are subject to interdependent cognitive, normative and regulative pressures, 
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which in turn are shaped by, among other institutional actors, governments and NGOs 
(Figure 1). The focal aspects of business strategy in the host country that we aim to 
investigate are the possible disengagement (i.e. decisions to exit the country or not to 
enter), and the adaptation of operational and branding strategies. Beyond these 
categories, we keep an open mind throughout our qualitative inquiry to identify others 
types of possible actions.  
*** Insert Figure 1 about here ***  
 Firms react differently to these pressures, dependent on how sensitive they are 
to the afore-mentioned institutional pressures (Kourula, 2011; Rehbein, Waddock & 
Graves, 2004; Teegen et al., 2004; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). For example, a consumer 
goods brand may be more susceptible to divestment pressures than a business-to-
business company. To capture a broad range of industry characteristics, we 
theoretically sample four industries using a 2x2 industry case design (Figure 2): First, 
we distinguish sectors with local market oriented from export oriented FDI; second 
we consider sectors with labor intensive and capital intensive FDI. As capital-
intensive, we investigated the oil and gas industry (primarily resource seeking) and 
the telecommunications industry (primarily market seeking); while as labor intensive 
we investigated the garments industry (primarily resource seeking) and consumer 
goods industries (primarily market seeking).  
For these industries, we explore the antecedents and consequences of adverse 
institutions originating in the investors’ home countries. Specifically, we ask what 
pressures are firms exposed to when operating in a country under international 
sanctions, and how do they react to these institutional pressures?  




Starting from our initial framework (Figure 1), we aim to build theory from case 
analysis, specifically to identify relevant dimensions of our constructs and their 
interrelationships. In particular, we pursue a ‘critical case analysis’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) 
with the aim to gain insights on how businesses deal with an extreme situation, and to 
incorporate such insights in a refined theoretical framework. The critical case allows 
us to observe the focal phenomenon, home country institutions, where they are 
particularly evident, and hence more tractable than in other contexts. 
Myanmar 1996 to 2011 provides such a critical case subject to a variety of 
institutional pressures that evolved in many home countries of MNEs over a long 
period of time (Table 1). This allows us to gather rich data of institutions and of 
businesses responses to such institutions. The year 1996 marked a peak of 
international business following a period of market-opening, which also triggered a 
major wave of NGO activism against doing business in Myanmar. The years 2010/11 
represent a time of gradual easing pressures culminating in US secretary of state 
Hillary Clinton’s visit in December 2011. Over this time period, we found a high 
degree of persistence in the basic patterns of gradually increasing institutional 
pressures on businesses, yet with subtle but important variations.  
*** Table 1 about here *** 
Our analysis has been guided by the grounded theory approach which is a 
form of inductive theory-building (Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki & Paavilainen-
Mäntymäki, 2011). This approach is well-suited to circumstances where the issue to 
be investigated is highly complex and/or previous research in the area is scarce and, 
thus, hypothesis testing is premature (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). It is thus particularly 
well suited to this project as it facilitates explorations of the multi-faceted impact of 
different types of home institutions on diverse strategic responses by businesses. Our 
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data gathering, coding, analysis and theory development has been guided by 
Charmaz’ (2006) approach to constructing grounded theory.  
Given the complexity of the subject, and its political sensitivity, obtaining 
primary data has been a major challenge. Interviews, photographic documents and 
field observations were collected in several waves: 1996, 1997, 2007, 2010 and in 
winter 2011/2012 when the sanctions regime started to be phased out. Most 
interviews were conducted in Myanmar with executives (both foreign and local) 
working in MNEs or foreign-affiliated businesses. In addition, we also interviewed 
consultants and experts in Myanmar. Outside Myanmar, we held interviews via 
telephone, email or face to face with human rights activists, campaigners, government 
officials, Burmese businesspersons on overseas visits and overseas Burmese with 
business interests in Myanmar.  Table 2 provides an overview of the interviewees.  
*** Table 2 about here *** 
Our primary data have been complemented by a wide range of secondary data, 
including media articles, publications by government and non-governmental 
organizations, materials published by activists on websites and internet discussions, 
published correspondence and publications from companies active in Myanmar.  
Our analysis went through six steps: In the exploratory step one, based on 
face-to-face interviews conducted in Myanmar in 1997 and 1998 and a review of 
archival data, it emerged that not all industries have been targeted equally. This initial 
research enabled purposeful sampling (as recommended by Poulis et al., 2013) of four 
industries that vary in the types of operations they might profitably conduct in 
Myanmar (Figure 2). Firms in these industries are subject to different types of 
institutional pressures, which allows us to observe and investigate a range of different 
reactions to institutions.  
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In step two, we conducted in-depth analysis of the four industry sub-cases to 
identify institutions and institutional actors and business strategies (Patton 2002). 
Specifically, this with-in case analysis identified three themes: business opportunities 
from the perspective of foreign business, sensitive issues in discourses on legality and 
ethics in the pertinent industry, and foreign investors’ home institutions involving 
cognitive, normative and regulative aspects. Table 3 was developed during step two. 
*** Insert Table 3 about here *** 
In step three, we did a cross-case analysis using a constant comparison approach 
to compare themes that emerged from different groups so as to fine-tune emergent 
propositions (Charmaz, 2006). In each industry, we thus identified institutions and 
institutional actors and how they impact on business, as summarized below. 
Moreover, we extracted quotes from the qualitative data that characterize the observed 
strategies adopted by international business that either stayed or left the country 
(Table 4).  
*** Insert Table 4 about here *** 
In step four, we aimed to enrich the initial framework by refining each 
component. We achieve this aim by supplementing and/or validating the secondary 
data with fieldwork observations, photographic documentations and face to face 
interviews and interviews by emails. In step five, the aim has been to make explicit 
some of the pivotal relationships in the model by expressing them in testable 
propositions.  
4. Context: Institutions and International Business in Myanmar 
As the national and international context of our study is central to the investigation, 
we first introduce the context and the institutions relevant in this empirical field. 
Following political and economic upheaval and the repression of dissidents in 1988, 
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the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) took control of Myanmar, 
ending 24 years of socialist government. However, the failure of the military regime 
to restore democracy, in addition to alleged narcotics production and labor rights 
violations, have shaped Myanmar’s external economic relations for almost two 
decades (Table 1). The US imposed sanctions against Myanmar in 1997 that were 
gradually intensified over the next two decades amid pressures by human rights and 
pro-democracy campaigners (Martin, 2012). Specifically, ‘new investments’ by US 
citizens and companies in Myanmar were prohibited.  In 2003, following another 
crackdown on political dissidents, the US government stepped up its sanctions with 
the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act which, among other measures, banned all 
imports from Myanmar to the US, with the exception of teak and gems processed 
outside Myanmar.  In 2008, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese Jade Act banned the 
importation of jadeite and rubies mined in Myanmar (Martin, 2012).  
Meanwhile, the EU in 1996 imposed a range of restrictions including a visa 
ban on top-ranking officials in the military regime and their family members, an arms 
embargo, and deferment of senior-level governmental visits to Myanmar (European 
Union, 1996). Following the oppression of protesters during the monks-led, nation-
wide demonstrations in 2007, the EU extended restrictions to include a ban on exports 
of Myanmar timber, metals and precious stones into the EU (Vogel 2009).  
These sanctions developed in the interplay of several institutional actors, 
including NGOs and national governments. For example, human rights groups 
campaigned for further trade sanctions in response to reports of severe human rights 
abuses (Oil and Gas Journal, 1997), while international consumer boycotts, or the 
threat of them, organized by Burma campaign groups reportedly led to the withdrawal 
of many companies (Bray 2002). Likewise, social investors demanded that companies 
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make ‘ethical’ investment decisions, and advocated shareholder resolutions for 
companies investing in Myanmar to develop guidelines about their policies there 
(Fulman 1997). At the supra-national level, the United Nations and the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) criticized Myanmar for the exploitation of forced labor and 
the perpetuation of human rights abuses (Silverstein, 2001). 
In contrast, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted a 
policy of economic and political ‘engagement’, arguing that this would be more 
effective in facilitating steady, stable and gradual change (Silverstein, 2001).  Thus, 
ASEAN admitted Myanmar as member in 1997, and, in 2011, agreed that the country 
would assume the chair of ASEAN in 2014. Likewise, Asian countries such as China, 
Japan and Korea experienced few if any substantive adverse institutional pressures on 
businesses operating in Myanmar. The rise of regional MNEs from, for example, 
China and Thailand since 2005 (Deng, 2009, Meyer and Thaijongrak, 2013, 
Pananond, 2007) thus increased the diversity of pressures on potential foreign 
investors.  
5. Business Responses to International Institutional Pressures 
To analyse the impact of adverse institutional pressures, we investigate four industries 
(Figure 2) with respect to a) relevant home institutions and b) business adaptations to 
such institutions.  
Resource seeking/capital intensive: oil and gas exploration 
In the oil and gas industry, Myanmar offers significant business opportunities to 
exploit natural resource deposits and to construct related infrastructure, such as ports 
and pipelines. Projects typically share several characteristics: (a) they are capital 
intensive, (b) they have long pay back periods from the start of construction to the 
generation of net revenues, (c) they involve close government interfaces due to the 
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need for licenses and permits, and (d) they require complementary capabilities from 
multiple companies (Asmus and Persechino, 1998, Frynas, 2005). In consequence, 
major projects are typically organized as consortia involving technology providers, 
construction firms, downstream future users of the resources, and local partners. In 
Myanmar during the period of our investigation, the participation of a local partner 
was mandatory, most frequently the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise 
(MOGE), and/or the military’s commercial arm, the Union of Myanmar Economic 
Holdings Company (UMEH).  
Institutions. Foreign investors in extractive industries have been heavily 
criticized by a variety of NGOs including trade unions, environmental activists 
(Casey, 2007), and pro-democracy groups (Oil and Gas Journal 1995; 2000; Reh, 
2005)). Their actions created direct and indirect pressures through all three forms of 
institutions. Cognitive pressures were created by raising public awareness in the US 
and Europe of (1) the general conditions in Myanmar, (2) the activities by MNEs in 
the country and (3) the supposed linkage between the two. For example, human rights 
activists publicized reports suggesting that investment in the oil and gas sector 
supported the military junta and damaged the environment in Myanmar, singling out 
the two Western MNEs operating in Myanmar since before 1997. Unocal, which 
partnered with MOGE in a US$1.2 billion project to pipe natural gas from Myanmar 
to Thailand, was accused of using ‘slave’ labor and being implicated in human rights 
abuses in the context of this pipeline consortium (Oil and Gas Journal, 2000; 
Holzmeyer, 2009). Likewise, French oil company Total attracted criticism for its 
investment in the Yadana pipeline project (Voice of America, 2009).  
 Initially, such awareness campaigns made some consumers and politicians 
cognizant of the pertinent issues and triggered debate in civil society, especially in the 
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US and the UK, thus undermining existing assumptions, i.e. cognitive institutions, on 
business in Myanmar. Norms promoted by NGOs with respect to “international” 
standards for labor, environment and human rights were gradually adopted by 
stakeholders, including shareholders. This led to normative pressures, which in some 
cases were reinforced by normative statements from home governments. For instance, 
in 2000, the British government requested Premier Oil Plc to withdraw from 
Myanmar (Oil and Gas Journal, 2000). Likewise, the French government has, from 
time to time, appealed to Total to review their investment in Myanmar.  
The normative pressures also influenced politicians in US. Under pressure “to 
take action”, they initiated regulative pressures such as the executive order prohibiting 
US companies from undertaking new investments in Myanmar. Of particular 
relevance to this sector in the US has also been Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
St. Reform Act in 2010, which required companies listed on US stock exchanges to 
reveal their financial contributions to host governments (Lugar and Cardin, 2010). In 
addition, NGOs used the court system to trigger regulative pressure. A civil suit in the 
USA under the Alien Torts Act against Unocal for its alleged complicity in human 
rights abuses by the Myanmar regime was settled in 2004 (Holzmeyer, 2009).  
 Business Reactions. US companies responded to the normative pressures, 
even in the absence of regulative requirements for a complete withdrawal. The initial 
sanctions by the US government in 1997 only prohibited US companies from 
committing “further” investment in Myanmar. Hence, US companies like 
Unocal/Chevron and Catarpillar were permitted to retain their existing operations as 
“status quo”. However, ARCO, an oil and gas company, pulled out of Myanmar when 
threatened by the possibility of a shareholder resolution, which itself arose from 
normative pressures supported by a call for boycott by the Free Burma Coalition, an 
19 
 
activist NGO. ARCO had invested over US$55 million, but did not renew its lease to 
explore gas in the Gulf of Martaban (Oil and Gas Journal, 2000).  ARCO quoted 
lower than expected finds for its decision, but pressures on US businesses to stop 
dealing with the junta also appear to have influenced that decision (Energy 
Economist, 1998). Also, Amoco and Texaco pulled out of Myanmar as a result of 
divestment resolutions by shareholders (Global Investor, 1995).  
While NGOs claimed credit for such withdrawals, this view has not been 
shared by local observers who pointed to the lack of profitable finds [Table 4, quote 
A-out1]. Moreover, for other oil and gas businesses, it has been ‘business as usual’. 
Companies from across Asia such as CNPC (China), Petronas (Malaysia), Nippon Oil 
(Japan), Daewoo (South Korea), Gail India, and Oil and Natural Gas (India) entered 
agreements with the government of Myanmar to explore and/or buy energy resources 
(The Australian, 2007; Quotes A-in1 and A-in2). Thus, withdrawals in this sector 
appear limited to a small number of cases that were still at early stages of exploration.  
Resource seeking/capital non-intensive: Garment Manufacturing 
The main business opportunities for the garment industry lay in export oriented 
businesses that exploit local inexpensive low-skilled labor based on relatively small 
capital investments. In consequence, sourcing decisions were far more flexible. Until 
2001, this industry experienced rapid growth in Myanmar, albeit from a very low 
base. However, the price competitiveness of the industry and Myanmar’s lack of 
unique resources placed the industry in a weaker negotiation position than the natural 
resource industry.   
 The leading business model of this industry involved offshore outsourcing 
(Doh 2005). Thus, brand name companies in Europe or North America would contract 
local companies to manufacture garments for them. However, the ‘local’ companies 
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are not necessarily domestically-owned: Companies from for example Korea, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan specialize in managing labor intensive manufacturing processes, 
and own plants in places like China, Vietnam or Myanmar. 
 Institutions. Consumer groups in the US, and to a lesser extent in the EU, 
amplified calls for a boycott of products from Myanmar around the year 2001. Their 
activities increased consumer awareness of the situation in Myanmar and created 
normative pressures on trade intermediaries to discontinue sourcing from Myanmar 
(Kudo, 2005). Formal restrictions were created in the USA with the Burma Freedom 
and Democracy Act in 2003, which banned the import into the USA of garments 
manufactured in Myanmar. The acceleration of different levels of pressure thus 
evolved highly interdependently [Table 4, quote B-out1].  
Another multilateral institution, perhaps paradoxically, encouraged sourcing 
garments from Myanmar, namely the multi-fibre-agreement (MFA). In the early 
2000s, countries like China and Vietnam hit their limits under the MFA quotas, which 
led to trade diversion effects benefitting Myanmar. The MFA expired in 2005 and 
with it its unintended trade diversion.  
 Business Reactions. These institutional pressures emanating outside the 
country had a strong impact on the garments industry. Especially Western clothing 
labels discontinued sourcing arrangements, which resulted in a decline of garment 
exports from Myanmar from estimated US$ 327 million in 2003/04 to US$ 216 
million in 2004/05, with exports to the USA falling by 50%. Especially small firms 
closed down, while foreign-owned businesses and those closely associated with the 
military continued to export (Kudo, 2005). The closures of garment factories resulted 
in job losses by factory workers, especially women, many of whom were migrant 
workers from rural areas [Table 4, quotes B-out2 & 3].  
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International garment labels that had outsourced manufacturing to Myanmar 
could easily terminate their activities in the country. In contrast, plant owners had 
sunk investment and could not as easily walk away. Especially for small businesses 
from neighbouring countries, writing off their investment was neither economically 
viable nor politically mandated [Table 4, quote B-in5]. One of their survival strategies 
included circumventing the ban by exporting via intermediate destinations. For 
example, it appears to have been common practice to sew in ‘Made in Thailand’ 
labels on garments made in Myanmar but finished in Thailand [Table 4, quote B-in1]. 
However, such strategies put pressures on the profitability of manufacturers in 
Myanmar because of reduced demand for ‘Made in Myanmar’ and intermediaries 
taking their commission [Table 4, quote B-in2].  
In the garments industry thus, home country norms influenced purchasing 
behaviors of key intermediaries, which led to falling garments exports, even before 
they were formally banned. Cognitive consumer awareness and normative pressures 
preceded the introduction of formal regulations, that themselves were an outcome of 
the normative pressures. With plenty of other locations offering inexpensive low-
skilled labor, importers in Europe and the US switched to alternative suppliers – 
especially after the expiry of the MFA. In contrast, countries like Korea or Japan with 
less consumer concern about human rights, continued to import garments from 
Myanmar [Table 4, quote B-in3].  
To sum up, the garments industry showed a stronger and more diverse 
business response than the oil and gas industry. There were more exits, especially by 
US buyers, and considerable downscaling of the industry. Notably, international 
garment labels reacted to normative pressures by discontinuation of sourcing from 
Myanmar even before new regulations came into force. At the same time, the plant 
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owners who had invested in machinery with substantial sunk costs found new markets 
both inside and outside Myanmar.  
Market seeking/capital intensive: Telecommunications 
Telecommunications offered great market potential in terms of unmet demand for 
services and infrastructure in Myanmar. However, international investment projects in 
this sector are often capital-intensive and involve substantial knowledge transfer, and 
they occur in a context of extensive host government regulation. During our study 
period, the country was considered to employ one of the most restrictive regimes in 
the world in terms of censoring and policing internet usage (Parker & Sam, 2005). 
Consequently, telecommunications remained relatively underdeveloped and under the 
direct control of a Myanmar government monopoly [Table 4, quote C-out1]. Only 1 in 
50 citizens had a phone line (fixed or mobile phones), while due to restricted access 
and high monthly fees, Myanmar ranked among the lowest in the world in terms of 
internet users (rank 158 of 216) (CIA, 2012).  
Institutions. The telecom industry was exposed to diffuse pressures because of 
conflicting impacts of their presence in Myanmar. On the one hand, telecom 
companies were implicated in the restrictions on freedom of speech and access to 
information imposed by the government. In 2005, Reporters Sans Frontières rated 
Myanmar as the country with the least free press in East Asia, due to the junta’s 
imprisonment of pro-democracy journalists and censorship of the press (The 
Irrawaddy 2005b). On the other hand, the internet and mobile phones in Myanmar 
played a pivotal role in distributing news and images of the September 2007 protests 
and the subsequent government crackdown, with protesters instantaneously 
transmitting images and text messages around the world. The effectiveness of these 
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communications resulted in the government temporarily shutting down all internet 
and phone services at the peak of the protests (Elmore, 2007).  
In consequence, the pressures on telecom companies have been controversial 
even among activists and NGOs. On the one hand, the government’s tight control and 
involvement of government officials and their family members provided basis for 
normative pressures not to invest in Myanmar. On the other hand, the telecom 
development arguably helped interconnectivity and, hence, the political opposition.  
 Business Responses. Given a strictly controlled and protected nature of the 
telecom industry in Myanmar, during our study period only a few foreign businesses 
operated in the sector, except in selling equipment [Table 4, quote C-in3].  The 
expansion of the Burmese telecom network has been led by two Chinese companies – 
ZTE and Alcatel Shanghai Bell (ASB), a joint venture between Alcatel-Lucent and 
Shanghai Bell, who constructed telecom towers in Yangon and Mandalay (Moe, 
2008). New Zealand’s state-owned telecom company, Kordia was another partner in 
these projects. This led to pressures by activists and opposition parties on the New 
Zealand government. The then prime minister of New Zealand defended Kordia’s 
involvement with four arguments: 1. New Zealand currently does not have formal 
sanctions on Myanmar, 2. The project was a joint-venture with a Thai company (ALT 
Inter Corporation), 3. The project involved a relatively small amount of investment 
(US$ 62,400), and 4. Helping the telecom sector to expand was “an aid to democracy” 
in that it facilitated information flows in and out of the country, pointing to the 
September 2007 protests as evidence that image protests were transmitted to the 
outside world aided by telecom technology (The Irrawaddy, 2008). 
In March 2010, a French television documentary alleged that French telecom 
giant Alcatel-Lucent was helping the military government to build infrastructure that 
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would allow it to police emails and filter other internet-based communications. 
Alcatel Lucent was involved via its Chinese joint venture ASB [Table 4, quote C-in1]. 
In a press release, Alcatel Lucent denied providing devices for monitoring calls or 
filtering the Internet, emphasizing instead that ASB had been involved in a Chinese 
government funded project to improve the telecom infrastructure of Myanmar. The 
project involved the establishment of a GSM mobile phone network to which ASB 
contributed physical infrastructure.  Alcatel Lucent also expressed “concern” about 
the political situation, arguing “that improving the communications infrastructure of a 
country largely benefits the people of that country, by supporting the population's 
economic and cultural well-being and ultimately its capacity to evolve to democracy” 
(Alcatel Lucent, 2010).  
While Chinese telecom companies operated in Myanmar as business as usual 
[Table 4, quote C-in2], Western companies kept a low profile. NGOs thus directed 
their attention to telecom companies with only small and indirect investments, or that 
were only engaged via selling of telecom equipment [Table 4, quote C-in3]. The main 
response from Western investors has been to engage with critical stakeholders, but not 
to downscale or withdraw from projects. On the other hand, they did not increase their 
investment commitments either.   
Market seeking/capital non-intensive: Branded consumer goods 
The local market in Myanmar opened to international consumer brands with 
economic liberalization in 1988, though demand remained low due to the low level of 
income. Foreign consumer brands could reach the Myanmar market via imports from 
third countries with or without a local operation or a direct sales relationship. 
Throughout the period of sanctions, many consumer brands from all over the world 
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were openly sold in Myanmar, including brands from countries with sanctions and/or 
active consumer boycott campaigns.  
 Institutions. The institutional pressures on branded consumer goods 
manufacturers originated in both their respective home countries and Myanmar itself. 
In Myanmar, restrictions and inconsistent regulation of the import of luxury goods 
created market imperfections that encouraged grey markets and informal border trade. 
Internationally, cognitive awareness and norms evolving under the influence of 
activists created pressures on MNEs to withdraw from Myanmar as a gesture of 
support to opposition movements (Bray 2002). For example, Burma Campaign UK 
argued that foreign investment would prolong the reign of the military regime and 
annually published, up until 2008, a “dirty list” with the names of companies active in 
Myanmar, arguing that such businesses contributed to funding or supporting the 
regime directly or indirectly.  
These normative pressures in the consumer goods sector have been reinforced 
by activist shareholders, boycott action groups and political initiatives such as the 
proposed, but never implemented, ‘selective purchasing’ law proposed in the State of 
Massachusetts. These pressures affected specifically US businesses because Asian 
and, to a certain extent European, counterparts faced fewer, if any, pressures not to 
sell their products in the country. 
Business Responses. Many Western consumer brands have been present 
in Myanmar through non-equity activities, relying on local small and medium-
sized enterprises or independent Thai or Indian owned companies as their local 
distributors or representatives. Some of these companies pulled out of Myanmar 
even before US sanctions were imposed in 1997, highlighting the effectiveness of 
normative pressures. Others delayed their entry or had no local presence before 
26 
 
the end of sanctions in 2012. However, our interviews suggest that not all 
‘departing’ companies withdrew their products completely.  
In spite of publicly declared intent to divest from Myanmar, some 
companies ‘downsized’ their local operations but maintained some form of local 
presence. Their brands continued to be widely available based on creative 
strategies that brought the brand to local consumers while, at the same time, limiting 
its exposure to foreign visitors and media (Reid et al., 2001; Thein, 2003). For 
example, many withdrew expatriates and transferred their responsibilities to less 
visible local staff [Table 4, quote D-in1]. Others disguised their links to Myanmar by 
using independent distributors, or to ‘leave’ exporting to border traders and smugglers 
[Table 4, quote D-in7]. However, it is difficult to distinguish between deliberate intent 
to obscure the link and the smugglers acting on their own accord.  
In the country itself, foreign brands kept a low visibility. In 1996/97, outdoor 
posters and banners around Yangon prominently displayed U.S. brands, especially for 
cosmetics and clothing, and ran ads on local TV stations.2 However, by 2007, they 
avoided big cities, and concentrated on country towns, where they could afford to be 
more visible [Table 4, quotes D-in2 & D-in3].  Outdoor advertising peaked around the 
mid-1990s but was drastically reduced following divestment pressures [Table 4, quote 
D-in6]. Some executives referred to billboard advertising in Myanmar as being the 
‘worst’ advertising tool because they provided the most visible and uncontrolled 
exposure of the advertized brand, and were thus particularly unhelpful for MNEs that 
hoped to keep their presence in Myanmar ‘under wraps’. Compared to billboards, 
television was believed to be a ‘safer’ medium [Table 4, quotes D-in4 & 5]. Others 
                                                        
2 The second author collected photographic evidence herself and from secondary sources, and 
recorded advertisements on Myanmar television on VCR.  
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used less visible promotion tools such as face-to-face demonstrations and product 
giveaways, as opposed to more ‘exposed’ conventional advertising. 
Hence, sanctions did not prevent the distribution of international brands in 
Myanmar. Rather, brand principals pursued a variety of low profile strategies that 
reduced local presence in terms of investment and public visibility, but still made 
products available locally.   
6. Conceptual Development 
A number of common themes arise from the analysis of our four industry cases. First, 
the three forms of institutions (Scott, 2002) are constantly in flux, their changes 
evolve interdependently, and they complement each other in creating pressures on 
businesses operating in Myanmar. The interdependence we observed appears to run 
from changes in cognitive institutions due to changes in the awareness of events in the 
country and how they may be related to MNEs operating in the country. These 
cognitive changes are the foundation for the development of normative pressures 
firstly directly on business (for example via consumer boycotts or shareholder 
resolutions) and secondly on governments and law makers that may respond changing 
regulative institutions [see Table 4, quotes B-out3 & C-in1].  
Second, we observed a variety of strategic responses that fall between the 
polar categories of ‘business as usual/entry’ and ‘exit/non-entry’, such as low 
commitment entry modes and organizational structures (Table 4, quote D-out1 & D-
in7), low profile branding, advertising and promotion (Table 4, quotes D-in4, 5 & 6), 
or serving the market indirectly via partners in a neighbouring country (Table 4, quote 
D-in8). These observations lead us to propose the concept of ‘low profile strategy’, 
defined as a strategy that reduces visibility and commitment but continues a presence 
in a given market, which we discuss further below.  
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Third, while the institutional pressures are quite similar across industries (see 
Table 3), business responses vary across industries. As we will discuss below, some 
of these variations follow the industry distinctions we used to structure our analysis 
(local market versus export orientation, capital-intensive versus non-capital-
intensive), while other variations follow other patterns, as we discuss below.  
Based on these three observations, we have revisited our initial framework 
(Figure 1) to refine the concepts and relationships and developed a more detailed 
conceptual framework of business in a country under international sanctions (Figure 
3). In the following, we explore some of these concepts and relationships in more 
detail, and offer testable propositions.  
*** Insert Figure 3 about here *** 
Low Profile Strategies 
Our data suggest that many of the strategies by firms active in Myanmar between 
1997 and 2011 can be characterized as ‘low profile strategies’ (Table 5). We find 
MNEs’ propensity to develop such strategies to vary across firms and industries, 
specifically their sensitivity and responsiveness of a firm to institutions, which in turn 
is associated with (1) reputation risk, (2) the size of the business opportunity and (3) 
the non-recoverable investments that would have to be written-off in case of an exit.  
These strategies are designed not only to comply with (regulative) sanctions, 
but to stay out of the ‘spotlight’ (Spar, 1998) of the media. Like the use of more 
independent entry modes in countries of high political risk (Brouthers, 1995), low 
profile strategies are used to reduce the exposure to risk. With respect to home 
institutions, they reduce the risk of attracting negative publicity and hence of a 
consumer boycott in the home country. For example, ‘indirect’ operation modes such 
as distributors based locally or in third countries (as opposed to own operations in 
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Myanmar) enable brand principals to comply with home country legal requirements 
while creating a perceived distance between the brand and the county under sanctions, 
[Table 5, quote Indirect-1 to 3]. Others manage their operations via their Singapore or 
Bangkok office rather than communicating directly with their Myanmar operation 
[Table 5, quote Reduce-1 & 2]. Moreover, foreign consumer brands were often 
promoted in Myanmar via local promotions rather than more visible advertising 
billboards [Table 5, quote Promotion-1 to 5]. Thus, adverse home institutions 
triggered a wide range of unorthodox market entry and promotion strategies, which 
we call low profile strategies: 
Proposition 1: In a sanctioned country, MNEs employ a wide variety of ‘low profile’ 
strategies that reduce visibility and commitment without complete discontinuation 
of operations.  
Reputation Risk  
A key concern motivating low profile strategies has been corporate reputation, a 
critical and potentially valuable aspect of branding (Fombrun & Shanley, 1999, 
Mahon, 2002). Reputation is, however, fragile in the sense that it can be 
damaged by actions considered unethical by key stakeholders. Reputation risk 
refers to the possible financial loss that a firm may suffer when its brand 
reputation is negatively affected. When designing their strategies, firms are 
conscientious of this risk, and perhaps for this reason high reputation companies 
have been found to stay out of least developed countries (Musteen, Rhyne & 
Zheng, 2012) and conflict zones (Driffield, Jones & Crotty, 2013). Such risk for 
corporate reputation is a major concern when it comes to engaging with a 
country that is de-legitimized by institutions in the firm’s home country. Thus, 
many US and European companies pulled out of the Myanmar market without 
being legally required to do so, because of concerns that association with an 
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international ‘pariah’ such as Myanmar could tarnish their corporate image:  
Proposition 2: In a sanctioned country, MNEs with higher reputation risk are more 
likely to exit, or to pursue low profile strategies. 
Reputation risk varies across industries. In the market seeking/labor-intensive 
sector (consumer goods) we observed companies being concerned that their brands 
may be negatively affected. Export-oriented/labor intensive businesses (garment 
manufacturing) reduced sourcing from Myanmar because consumers reject the 
products themselves because of the “Made in Myanmar” association (Table 4, quotes 
B-out1 to 4). In contrast, resource seeking/capital intensive businesses in the oil and 
gas sector continued depite of adverse pressures, while withdrawals appeared to be 
mostly caused by technical difficulties and unprofitable finds (Table 4, quote A-out1).  
Hence, we observe greater sensitivity to normative institutions in sectors 
where consumers can make a direct connection between the product or brand they buy 
and the firms’ activity in Myanmar. Among resource-seeking firms, this had a 
stronger effect on garments because the physical label ‘Made in Myanmar’ would 
create a cognitive linkage to the country, whereas oil and gas was sold relatively 
anonymously via wholesale markets.  
For market-seeking firms, the linkage was created by NGOs publishing lists of 
firms active in Myanmar, which premium brands especially saw as a threat to their 
reputation. For example, Pepsi Co withdrew from Myanmar following boycott calls in 
the US [Table 4, quote D-out1]. In this case, activists succeeded in raising cognitive 
awareness of consumers and other stakeholders, which led to normative pressures on 
businesses to withdraw from Myanmar. Reputation risk thus is subject to consumers’ 
cognitive beliefs, which may trigger a boycott of a brand or company. If a valuable 
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reputation is at stake, such pressures may lead to a decision to cease operating in a 
targeted country, even without legal prohibition (Table 4, quotes D out-2 & 3). Hence, 
Proposition 3a: The reputation risk that may induce firms to pursue low profile strategies 
or to exit is positively associated with a) products that fully or in part originate from 
the sanctioned country, b) brands that are associated with business in the 
sanctioned country. 
Reputation risk also depends on characteristics of the firm itself (Godfrey, Merrill & 
Hansen, 2009) and its stakeholders. In particular, it increases with the size of the firm 
as bigger companies are more likely to be targeted by activists (Rehbein et al, 2004). 
For instance, Burma Campaign UK launched special campaigns focusing on large 
companies in for example oil and gas (Total), insurance (Lloyd of London) and 
tourism (Lonely Planet). Large firms even faced pressures when their link to Myanmar 
was only indirect, for instance as joint venture partners or as up- and downstream 
customers and suppliers. For instance, one report targeted companies that provided 
insurance services to companies operating in Myanmar or that had offshore partners 
that in turn subcontracted work to Myanmar (Burma Campaign UK, 2008). Larger 
firms with complex supplier relations and/or geographically dispersed subsidiaries are 
thus at greater risk of adverse home institutional pressures. Hence, reputation risk 
emerges from our data as driven by firm characteristics, such as its size:  
Proposition 3b: The reputation risk that may induce firms to pursue low profile strategies 
or to exit is positively associated with the size of the firm itself.  
Reputation risk is also related to a brand’s country of origin. While North American 
and European enterprises appeared somewhat cautious, Asian businesses (in 
particular, from China, Thailand, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia) have 
developed thriving investment and trade relationships. In particular, in the resource-
seeking industries (garments, as well as oil and gas), all direct investment came from 
Asian firms. By the late 2000s, Chevron and Total were the only remaining major 
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Western businesses in the oil and gas industry, while, new investors from a range of 
Asian nations were competing to build relationships with the government to access 
Myanmar’s offshore gas deposits and other energy sources [Table 4, quote A-in1].  
In the market-seeking/capital non-intensive sector, many Asian brands were 
marketed in a business-as-usual manner whilst Western-brands were promoted via 
low profile strategies to avoid unwanted attention from journalists and human rights 
activists in their home countries or key markets [e.g. Table 4, quote D-in9]. Western 
brands thus had to negotiate conflicting pressures between exposure to Western 
visitors in Myanmar, and local consumers seeking consumer goods of higher quality. 
The underlying institutional issue is that Asian firms face less risk to their 
reputation by their association with Myanmar compared to Western businesses, 
because in Western countries norms evolved to penalize businesses dealing with 
Myanmar in part because their consumers were less aware of the specific political 
situation, and in part their home country society had less missionary zeal trying to 
change other countries. As a result, Asian firms were more active in Myanmar in a 
business-as-usual mode, whilst those from the US and the EU operate with more 
restricted modes (Table 4, quotes B-in5, D-in 9):  
Proposition 3c: The reputation risk that may induce firms to pursue low profile strategies 
or to exit is positively associated with a) the cognitive awareness in the home 
country of conditions in the sanctioned country, and b) with the normative 
pressures to transfer the home country’s norms to the host country.  
Business Opportunity 
The second set of influences relates to the size of business opportunity in the country, 
relative to alternative opportunities. In market-seeking sectors, many MNEs operating 
in Myanmar sought early mover advantages in building reputation with local 
consumers and stakeholders while being somewhat protected from competition. Such 
early mover advantages included brand awareness, large initial market share, local 
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network contacts and, in some cases, long-term contracts with the Myanmar 
government. Notably, in the consumer goods sector, where brand awareness is a key 
advantage, early entering brands from Japan (such as Toyota, Toshiba, Sony, Konica, 
Kanebo) and Korea (such as Samsung, Daewoo, Kose) were well established with 
Myanmar consumers, creating major challenges for Western brands that made their 
entry (or re-entry) after 2011 [Table 4, quote A-in2]. Early movers expected the value 
of first mover advantages to exceed the downside of not being aligned with the 
sanctions regime. 
In resource seeking sectors, the availability of alternatives for scarce 
resources determined the size of the business opportunity. This explains the 
differences between the garments and the oil and gas sectors: Garments can be 
manufactured at many places around the world, while natural resource deposits are 
scarce. Hence, natural resource businesses have fewer alternative investment 
opportunities, which explains their keen interest in Myanmar. Some energy firms 
have defied pressures from home institutions to retain their access to scarce resources, 
such as gas fields (Table 4, quotes A-in2 & 3), while garment firms were much more 
responsive to calls for market exit, largely by working with alternative suppliers in 
other nations (Table 4, quotes B-out2, 3 & 4). Hence,  
Proposition 4: In a sanctioned country, MNEs are less likely to exit, and more likely to 
pursue low profile strategies, when they perceive relatively unique business 
opportunities arising from a) first mover advantages in local markets, or b) local 
resources that are scarce and not easily substitutable from other sources. 
Non-recoverable Investments 
A third factor determining the actions of firms already present in the country are the 
non-recoverable investments that would have to be written off in case of an exit. For 
example, Chevron/Unocal and Caterpillar were present in Myanmar before the 
prohibition of new investment in 1997. They were permitted to continue operating as 
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they were ‘grandfathered’ into the Myanmar sanctions regime introduced in 1997 
(Interviewee Z23, 2012), yet faced normative pressures. However, they had already 
made substantial commitment, especially when they had entered legally binding long-
term contracts with partners in a consortium. These investments generated cash flow 
despite the sanctions. Yet, due to financial sanctions prohibiting transactions 
involving Myanmar, few, if any, Western buyers would be willing to buy the assets at 
‘normal market values’ (Table 4, quote A-in3). The sale of such assets, for example 
oil exploration sites, would thus involve a substantive write-off because markets for 
assets in Myanmar were depressed during the sanctions as US and EU bidders were 
not permitted to buy such assets (Table 4, quote A-in3). Selling such assets, to local 
firms at a depressed price would, however, hand over assets to the military regime 
and, hence, create effects contrary to the purpose of the sanctions. Asian buyers would 
have been willing to fill in the vacuum, but such a replacement would not achieve the 
underlying intentions of disrupting the economy of the sanctioned economy.  
This issue has been most relevant in capital-intensive industries such as oil & 
gas and telecommunications where exit costs are high due to large investment and 
potential contingent liabilities from contracts. Exit costs are lower in labor-intensive 
sectors such as garment manufacturing where fixed investments are small (Table 4, 
quote B-out4). Hence:  
Proposition 5: In a sanctioned country, MNEs are less likely to exist, and more likely to 
pursue low profile strategies, the higher the non-recoverable investments they 
previously incurred. 
7. Discussion  
We have explored the complex network of institutional pressures in MNEs’ home 
countries that de-legitimize engaging in business with a particular country. Benefiting 
rich qualitative data gathered in Myanmar through interviews, site visits and 
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observations for over many years, our analysis focused on the adaptations of 
businesses, not only in terms of possible divestment – the most radical response – but 
the more fine-grained strategies that firms develop to handle a variety of home 
institutional pressures. Our findings are synthesized in our theoretical framework 
(Figure 3), which points to reputation risk, size of the business opportunity, and non-
recoverable investments as key moderators of the relationships between institutions 
and the strategic responses by firms, and low profile strategies in particular. 
Contributions 
The current study explored how restrictive home institutions impact on strategies, 
using a critical case of international business activities in Myanmar during 1996 to 
2011, the period when the country was the target of institutional pressures to divest, 
particularly in Europe and North America. We thus extend the growing body of 
knowledge on how firms react to demands by stakeholders such as NGOs 
(Christmann, 2004, Doh & Guay, 2006, Teegen, Doh & Vachani, 2004, Yaziyi & 
Doh, 2009) and the media (Spar, 1999). Especially our focus on local strategies of 
firms, as opposed to those at a head-quarter level, pushed forward an area largely 
ignored in international business research.  
Our study also contributes to the area of human rights and business 
(Carswell, 1981, van Wyk et al., 2004, Holliday, 2005), in particular the question 
whether sanctions are able to achieve their aims of disrupting the host economy, 
or specific groups within the host society. Our framework and the qualitative 
data provide a more realistic understanding of how businesses react to home 
institutional pressure pointing in particular to differential impact across 
industries. In addition, important contributions are also made in an under-
researched geography; international investment, trade and consumer behavior 
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in emerging South-East Asian economies (Meyer, 2006, Tipton, 2007, Xu and 
Meyer, 2013), and Myanmar in particular (Lwin et al., 2006, Reid et al., 2001).  
Myanmar 1996-2011 represents a ‘critical case’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) where 
home institutions could be expected to be particularly constraining in their 
effects on business. While we have found this to be the case, we also observed 
that businesses even so are present in the country, in particular through low 
profile strategies. Considering effects of extra-territorial institutions more 
generally (i.e. rules that affect business in a country other than where the 
institutions originate), our case study provides some suggestive insights.  All 
three forms of institutions occurring outside the target country – cognitive, 
normative and regulative – exert pressures on business and its strategic choices.  
Even without regulatory sanctions regime, in some cases, normative pressures 
(led by cognitive awareness) are effective in changing the behavior of business, 
although the effectiveness of this impact is moderated by industry and firm-
specific factors.   
Future Research  
Having opened international business research into the complex net of home 
institutions on businesses operating in a politically sensitive context, we hope to 
stimulate further research. In the first instance, such research may test some of 
our propositions. To this end, the easing of the sanctions and the opening of the 
economy may provide opportunities for data-collection in Myanmar that hitherto 
have not been available; for example consumer surveys. Another approach 
would be to investigate other countries under international sanctions, such as 
Iran, Sudan and Cuba to identify and explain variations across host countries.  
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A broader research agenda emerges with extra-territorial effects of 
institutions more generally. Institutions aiming to shape business activities 
outside their home country are a growing phenomenon, taking both formal 
forms, such as anti-corruption and anti-money laundering legislation, and 
informal forms such as normative pressures stimulated by NGOs. We lack at this 
time theoretical understanding of the roles of such extra-territorial institutions 
and their interactions with other pressures; we hope our research may stimulate 
such research as well.  
8. Conclusion 
Institutions affect business even when they operate outside their home country. 
Using Myanmar as a critical case of international business under adverse home 
country institutions, we explored the diversity of business responses. Our 
findings illustrate why normative pressure can be powerful in influencing firm 
strategy, even in the absence of regulative restrictions. Firms vary in their 
responses to institutional pressures due to differences in exposure to reputation 
risk, size of business opportunities and the non-recoverable nature of their 
investment. NGOs appear to be aware of such differential sensitivity to 
normative institutions and target their actions accordingly. Our framework may 
help all actors (NGOs, businesses, governments) aiming to influence institutions 
governing business operating outside their home country, and opens new 
avenues for research into the extra-territorial effects of institutions.   
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Table 1: Timeline: Myanmar, the USA and supra-national organizations 
 Events in Burma Reactions of supra-
national organizations 
Reactions by US authorities  
1960s 1962: Coup d’etat staged 
by the military starts 
socialist style development 
policies 
None  None 
1970s Ongoing military rule with 
socialist style economic 
policies 
None  None  
1980s 1987/88: Popular protests 
against military rules were 
eventually squashed. 
1988: suspension of non-
humanitarian aid by the 
Western nations and 
Japan; the World Bank and 
IMF cease lending  
1989 (USA): discontinuation 
of preferential trade 
arrangements 
 
1990s 1990: Parliamentary 
election won by the 
National League for 
Democracy (59.9% of 
votes) ahead of the 
military’s National Unit 
Party (21.2%). However, 
parliament was never 
convened, opposition 
leaders were arrested and 
detailed, Aung San Suu Kyi 
under house arrest. 
1995: Temporary release 
of Aung San Suu Kyi from 
house arrest; increased 
crackdown on democratic 
movements and ethnic 
minorities in border areas 
1990 – 2000 (UN): the 
Commission on Human 
Rights several times called 
for the Myanmar 
government to improve its 
human rights records 
1991 (UN): the General 
Assembly issued strong 
resolutions against 
Myanmar 
1997 (ASEAN): admitted 
Myanmar as a member 
1998 (ILO): the 
International Labor 
Organization issued a 
report on forced labor in 
Myanmar 
1990: Section 138 of Customs 
and Trade Act requires the 
President to impose economic 
sanctions (basis for EO 13047 
in 1997). 
1991: Bilateral textile 
agreement lapsed and was not 
renewed. 
1997: Executive Order 13047 
bans all new investments in 
Burma 
1997: tariff preferences to 
Myanmar were withdrawn 
 
2000s 2007: widespread 
demonstrations led by 
Buddhist monks. 
2009 (EU): ban on 
imports of Myanmar 
timber, metals and 
precious stones. 
2003: Burmese Freedom and 
Democracy Act and Executive 
Order 13310 prohibit the 
provision of financial services 
to Myanmar. 
2008: Tom Lantos Block 
Burmese Jade Act bans import 
of products containing 
Burmese jadeite and rubies. 
2010s 2011: Aung San Suu Kyi 
released from house arrest, 
and elected to parliament 
in a by-election 
2012 (EU): sanctions 
gradually phased out 
2011: Secretary Clinton visits 
Burma. 
2012: sanctions gradually 
phased out 
Note: This table does not cover sanctions aimed directly against individuals associated with the 
Burmese military, such as visa bans and freezing of assets. 




Table 2: Summary of Interviews 
 Interviewees by Nationality Interviews (a) Interviewee 
reference code Myanmar Other 
Asian 
Europe US Myanmar Overseas 
1996-98 2007 2010-12 2010 2012 
Oil and gas 6      7   A1 to A6 
Garment 
manufacturing 
8 1   3 1 5   B1 to B9 
Telecommunication 8 1     9   C1 to C9 
International 
consumer goods  
16 7 3  29 3  1  D1 to D26 




3 2 1  11     X1 to X6 
US State Department     2     2 Y1 to Y2 
Notes: (a) the total number of interviews exceeds the number of interviewees as several interviewees have been interviewed several times. 
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Table 3: Industry Contexts  
Industry Business 
Opportunities 
Sensitive Issues Home Institutions 
Resource-seeking 
Capital Intensive 
(mining, oil & gas,) 
  Availability of natural 
resources that are 





infrastructure such as 
pipelines, ports etc  
  The contribution to local employment 
  Distribution of wealth generated from 
projects 
  Environmental and human rights impact 
(including displacement of local 
communities)  
  Ethnic tension and conflict 
  Partnering with a government with poor 
human rights record 
  Governance issues in ethnic minority areas 
Cognitive: increased awareness of situation in 
Myanmar due to NGO campaigns and media reports 
specifically focused on the oil and gas sector;  
Normative: reduced legitimacy of business operations 
in Myanmar, pressures to divest because operations in 
Myanmar are branded as unethical 
Regulative (USA): (1) 1997 government ban on new 
investment in Myanmar , (2) 1789 Alien Tort Claims 
Act, (3) 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall St Reform Act requiring 
US companies to reveal financial transactions with host 
governments.  
Resource-seeking 
labor intensive  
(Garments) 
manufacturing) 
  Exploitation of low cost 
labor; 
  Bypass MFA trade 
restriction affecting 
other Asian economies 
(before 2005) 
  Consumer sensibility for country of origin 
image (in US and EU) 
  Labor standards and human rights for 
workers in garment manufacturing 
Cognitive: increased awareness of situation in 
Myanmar due to NGO and trade union campaigns and 
media reports;  
Normative: reduced legitimacy of products made in or 
associated with Myanmar, partially enforced via 
consumer boycott actions; 
Regulative: Global MFN agreement which expired in 
2005; (USA): 2003 Burma Freedom and Democracy Act 








  Potential military use of infrastructure and 
telecommunication 
  Freedom of speech and potential for 
monitoring opposition groups 
  Partnering with a government with poor 
human rights record  
Cognitive: increased awareness of situation in 
Myanmar in general due to NGO campaigns and media 
reports;  
Normative: reduced legitimacy of business operations 
in Myanmar, and co-investments with government 
associated businesses in particular. 
Regulative: 1997 government ban on new investment 
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  Current demand, albeit 
small 
  Early mover 
advantages in view of 
long term local market 
potential  
  Impact of Myanmar market activity on 
global brand image 
  The Myanmar Government restrictions on 
imports  of consumer goods 
  Corruption and absence of genuine 
competition  
Cognitive: increased awareness of situation in 
Myanmar in general due to NGO campaigns and media 
reports. 
Normative: reduced legitimacy of business operations 
in Myanmar.  
Regulative: proposed but never implemented 
Massachusetts selective purchasing law. 
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Table 4: Business Responses in Quotations  
Industry On Businesses that Left On Businesses that Stayed 
Resource-seeking 
Capital Intensive  
(mining, oil & gas)  
[A-out1] “Oh, of course, yes, many did withdraw. The 
nature of the oil business is very uncertain, the finds are 
unpredictable. Although you are spending lots and lots 
on exploration works, no one can guarantee that you will 
find oil and will be commercially viable. There are lots of 
risks. Some companies left in the middle of exploration 
work. In oil/gas, you have to use indirect methods, in 
finding. Form a hypothesis and explore, but there are lots 
other influencing factors, and it is very uncertain. Both 
Western and Asian companies face these problems. They 
exit because of these uncertainties. They started and 
showed negative results and they have spent quite a bit 
and decided not to continue. And left. Not because of 
activists’ pressures. Shell (the Dutch company) left, 
because they couldn’t find commercial quantity” 
[interviewee A1, 2012].   
[A-in-1] “Offshore, there are about 20 companies and onshore also about that 
many. Mostly Asian companies, Chinese, Thais and Malaysian and 
Indonesian. Not that many Western right now [20 January 2012]. There is 
Total and their partner Unocal/Chevron.  There are Japanese, but they are 
partners. As operators, you will have mostly Thailand, Korea Daewoo and 
CNOOC. CNOOC is China’s third biggest national oil company.” [Interviewee 
A1, 2012]. 
[A-in-2] “Chinese companies certainly have a strong foothold; sector-wise I 
am not so sure, but they have gone into long term contracts (30/40 years) 
for a lot of things. The extractive industries, it has. Well, Burma opening up 
now, and the Chinese opposes it … In competing against Chinese, I don’t say 
that we have an advantage over Chinese. Chinese businesses have already 
taken first steps; they have a first-mover advantage” [Interviewee C1, 2012]. 
[A-in-3] “Total won’t leave as it has committed such a big investment, has 
already built the pipeline and that can’t be left alone and has already signed 
contract etc. with the Thai side, to sell the gas. How could they leave now? 
They have to stay put, but they don’t expand any further. They have enough 
problems maintaining what they have got (the pipeline), rather than 
expanding. They are not involved in any new projects. Just the pipeline, they 
have maintained” [Interviewee A3, 2012]. 
Resource-seeking 
Capital Non-intensive  
(Garments 
manufacturing) 
[B-out1] “The formal sanctions on garments (made in 
Burma) came in … 2003. But it has been starting a bit 
before that. In 2000, there has been a petition from 
business to lift the sanctions, and that somewhat delayed 
imposition of the sanctions, until 2003; then the formal 
sanctions were imposed." (Interviewee B1, 2012). 
[B-out2] “There were nearly 400 factories in 2000, the 
lowest time for this industry is 2004/2005, then only 170 
factories left in Myanmar. So over 100 factories closed. 
[B-in1] “In Thailand, they might put buttons on clothes sent from Myanmar 
and call it ‘Made in Thailand,’ it can be done very easily, therefore, I don’t 
think these restrictions are effective, business people always find a way 
around whatever restrictions are placed on them”.  [Interviewee B4, 2012]. 
[B-in2] “The impact on the garment business is huge too. Because of the 
sanctions, for those garment manufacturers who remained despite the 
sanctions, they had to do business indirectly, instead of getting business from 
clothing labels themselves, and therefore they can’t get the prevailing market 
prices. They have become subcontractors, sneaking around to get the 
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Very big impact! 200, 000 laborers lost the job… . Before 
sanctions were imposed, there were more foreign players 
in that sector, but a lot of them withdrew because of 
sanctions. Another reason for foreign company’s 
withdrawals also had to do with the issue of quota [under 
MFN]. When quota restrictions were dismantled, they no 
longer needed Myanmar for a reason for quota.”  
(Interviewee B2, 2012) 
[B-out3] “...well, after year 2000, a lot of them withdrew, 
because they had US buyers. At the time, 80% of 
buyers/brands were from the US ... We, at the time, 
focused a lot on the US market. The buyers withdrew 
because of sanctions. Year 2000 was a peak period for 
the garment factories here. We had nearly 4000 factories 
here. Starting from 2001/2, it started to decline” 
(Interviewee B1, 2012). 
[B-out4] “Hwa Foo [is] the Chinese company that was 
manufacturing for Adidas. In that case, Hwa Foo had to 
leave Myanmar too. The investment isn’t that much and 
therefore it wasn’t that big a deal to leave. The building 
belonged to the government and the only issue is the 
machinery that can be sold to others. .... It is labor 
intensive, but not capital intensive, it is easy to 
withdraw” [Interviewee B1, 2012]. 
business and operate secret operations etc. So people at the grassroot level 
were the ones who suffered as a result of Western sanctions. Same things 
with gemstones, they don’t get the market price. We get the thief prices.” 
[Interviewee B3, 2012]. 
[B-in3] “Daewoo, Segyl, most of the Korean companies, Chinese and Taiwan 
companies, they remained here. They switched the market from the US to 
European countries, mostly Germany brands, and even the Latin American 
market, and also the Japanese market. But, the quality control for the 
Japanese market is very high, higher than the US market. If we have a chance, 
we all prefer a US buyers/market as they pay us more for CMP [Cut, Making 
and Packaging] and it is more profitable. And the US quality control is lower 
than others and the pieces for the US market aren’t that difficult to make.” 
[Interviewee B2, 2012]. 
[B-in4] “There is more profit making clothes for the local market. Roughly, 
my profit per a garment item is $1.50, compared to only $8 for a dozen items. 
So, more profit from the local market.” [Interviewee B6, 2012] 
[B-in5] “The foreign investors in the garment industry are from Taiwan and 
Korea and China. They are the majority. They do, what we call, CMP [Cut 
Making and Packaging]. They represent lots of brands. Some of them are 
joint ventures and some are wholly owned. Some do have local partners” 




[C-out1] “About telecommunication industry, currently 
we have three areas: 1. Selling accessories, 2. Service 
provisions and 3. Building infrastructure. Service 
provision is still completely controlled by the 
government, no outsider yet. In service provisions, the 
local businesses are all competing with each other, very 
complicated. The only area, foreigners are allowed to be 
involved for now is in infrastructure building. That’s all, 
for the rest of the telecom industry, no foreign business, 
only the local firms competing with each other.”  
 [C-in1] "Alcatel was in partnership with Shanghai Bell (SB). When Shanghai 
Bell sold telecom equipment to Myanmar, because of the partnership 
connection between Alcatel and SB, Alcatel got into trouble with activists.” 
[Interviewee C9, 2012]   
[C-in2] “I helped set up [this company] about ten years ago. It is okay for the 
company. It stayed throughout the sanctions era. No impact” [Interviewee 
C9, 2012] 
[C-in3] “As far as foreign investment is concerned, the only area currently 
that has foreign companies participating is in selling equipment. Right now, 
we have three foreign companies selling telecom equipments to the 
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(Interviewee C8, 2012). 
 
government projects. They are ZTE, Huawai, and Ericsson. Ericsson just came 




[D-out1] “For Pepsi, the headquarter themselves 
decided to withdraw.  It was under pressure.  But for 
us, … [Western alcohol brand], they would not pull out 
like Pepsi did.  But they keep it just low profile, 
meaning they don't do any promotional program more 
than what the EU and US sanctions allow.  (Interviewee 
D13, 1997). 
[D-out2] But whatever many we had have pulled out.  
[The American research company] pulled out.  They have 
been here only one to two years, they are an American 
company.  They had to leave.  [A American film brand] 
had to leave too because of American trade sanctions 
(Interviewee X2, 1997/98). 
[D-out3] I am sure that they will try to facilitate that on 
the border area and whatever they can.  I don't think that 
was a major strategy or anything like that.  They don't 
need to be involved; the demand was so high that the 
smugglers will satisfy that demand.  Also it keeps the 
cigarettes fresh, because after a few months, cigarettes 
do get stale.  So, smugglers will supply some limited 
amount of fresh stuff on the market and keep the brand 
alive for the parent company  (Interviewee X2, 1997/98). 
[D-out4] Product will run out legally, but illegally the 
product will still be around.  They withdraw the 
marketing, they withdraw the correct channel to bring 
the product in, but the product will still probably come 
through other channel.  There are already businesses 
going around and buying up the stocks.  Hold on to it and 
resell it at a higher price.  (Interviewee X1, 1997/98). 
[D-in-1] “Many expatriates working in different companies have been pulled 
back either to Thailand, or Vietnam.  But their office remained and run by the 
locals now.”  (Interviewee D11, 1996/97) 
[D-in-2] “Yeah, actually they can go to the outskirts and do it.  Don't do it in 
Yangon, it's fine.  Yangon, Mandalay, nobody knows where you are.  And a lot 
of these places, there's a lot of local population that a foreigner can’t go.  
Right?  And that's the place you can sell, why are you worrying?  The market 
is big.  So you don't do it in Yangon and Mandalay.”  (Interviewee X1, 1997). 
[D-in-3] “Yes, they [a European consumer giant] are afraid of trade sanctions.  
They don't advertise much, instead they…go to country side and …”yell” 
around the country, ……give out samples and explain the product.”  
(Interviewee X5, 1998) 
[D-in-4] “[an American brand] is probably a good example.  They did not 
want to do billboards because that is a bit too permanent.  But they still 
advertise on TV.  Because it is 30 sec and gone, right, billboards are there 24 
hours a day” (Interviewee X3,1998). 
[D-in-5] “People can take photographs [of billboards], so TV is good, you 
know, it just come and go, it's one flash and no-one else will see.  That 
problem only applies to Yangon“  (Interviewee X4, 1998). 
[D-in6] “[Japanese manufacturers] are scared. They have millions of sales 
volume in US.  Here they have let's say only [small number] of units per year.  
Even 1% drop in sales over in US is bigger than what they will get from this 
market.  Plainly speaking, they are even now asking to pull down some of the 
billboards.  They don't support billboards any more.  They used to support 
before.  They used to pay for the costs, but now they not only did not pay for 
the costs, they are asking to pull [them] down.”  (Interviewee X1, 1998). 
(D-in7) We, as [the company], do not sell.  We sell to importer’s hands.  Any 
importer can buy what they like, any amount.  Just importer brings the goods 
in and sells them here.  The only thing, if we don't sell, of course, importer 
can't get the goods.  So our main [task] is supplying to this importer and he 
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distributes for us and we also appoint the distributor  (Interviewee D26, 
1998). 
[D-in8] “Are they [the manufacturer] a bit concerned about international 
politics [US sanctions]?  No, because, although we deal with England company, 
our products are from Indonesia, so they are an ASEAN product.  And our 
trading is with Singapore, so we in fact we have nothing to do with England.”  
(Interviewee D12, 1998). 
[D-in9] “But [the American brand] has been smart because while they 
advertised on television, they don't do outdoor advertising, in terms of 
billboards, don't do press advertising, which journalists can pick up on easily.  
But for TV, it is harder to pick up on.  It is really smart.  They do a lot of POPs 
[point of purchase] trades and a little tin plate sign for restaurants.  Billboards 
and newspaper advertising, easy to get hold of it by journalists.  [They] will be 





Table 5: Open coding process: Low profile strategies  











[Indirect-1] “The impact on the garment business is huge too. Because of the 
sanctions, for those garment manufacturers who remained despite the sanctions, 
they had to do business indirectly, instead of getting business from clothing labels 
themselves, and therefore they can’t get the prevailing market prices. They have 
become subcontractors, sneaking around to get the business and operate secret 
operations etc.” [Interviewee B3,2012]. 
[Indirect-2] “[The brand] withdrew all dealership, because it was an American 
company.  But they have a company in Singapore; that company buys for them.  So 
instead of direct, they are doing indirect.”  (Interviewee D19, 1998).  
[Indirect-3] “In Thailand, they might put buttons on clothes sent from Myanmar and 
call it ‘Made in Thailand,’ it can be done very easily, therefore, I don’t think these 
restrictions are effective, business people always find a way around whatever 
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 [Reduced-1] “Banks rep offices have pulled out including UOB, Thai Military bank 
and Thai bank.  Some had expatriates called back, but just the local guys are left 
there.”  [Interviewee X2, 1996/97] 
[Reduced-2] “Many expatriates working in different companies have been pulled 
back either to Thailand, or Vietnam.  But their office remained and run by the locals 











[Promotion-1] “Yeah, actually they can go to the outskirts and do it.  Don't do it in 
Yangon, it's fine.  Yangon, Mandalay, nobody knows where you are.  And a lot of these 
places, there's a lot of local population that a foreigner can go.  Right?  And that's the 
place you can sell, why are you worrying?  The market is big.  So you don't do it in 
Yangon and Mandalay.”  [Interviewee X1, 1997]. 
[Promotion-2] “Yes, they [a European consumer giant] are afraid of trade sanctions.  
They don't advertize much, instead they…go to countryside and …”yell” around the 
country, ……give out samples and explain the product.”  [Interviewee X5, 1998]. 
[Promotion-3] “People can take photographs [of billboards], so TV is good, you know, it 
just come and go, it's one flash and no-one else will see.  That problem only applies to 
Yangon.”  [Interviewee X4, 1998]. 
[Promotion-4] “[an American brand] is probably a good example.  They did not want 
to do billboards because that is a bit too permanent.  But they still advertize on TV.  
Because it is 30 sec and gone, right, billboards are there 24 hours a day.”  
[Interviewee X3,1998]. 
[Promotion-5] “[Japanese manufacturers] are scared. They have millions of sales 
volume in US.  Here they have let's say only [small number] of units per year.  Even 
1% drop in sales over in U.S. is bigger than what they will get from this market.  
Plainly speaking, they are even now asking [them] to pull down some of the 
billboards.  They don't support billboards any more.  They used to support before.  
They used to pay for the costs, but now they not only did not pay for the costs, they 
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Figure 2: Study Design: Selection of Industries 
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